Water Law Review
Volume 7

Issue 1

Article 61

9-1-2003

Pruitt v. Douglas County, 66 P.3d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003)
James Parrot

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
James Parrot, Court Report, Pruitt v. Douglas County, 66 P.3d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003), 7 U. Denv.
Water L. Rev. 215 (2003).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Issue I

COURT RFPORTS

mandating that the original petition state why Crutchfield believed the
Board's activities were unlawful. The Board argued Crutchfield failed
to allege harm to her recreational enjoyment as a result of the
permitted discharge.
The Virginia Supreme Court found the
argument unpersuasive. A letter attached to the original petition
satisfied the local rule's pleading requirement by detailing the ways in
which recreational enjoyment would suffer as a result of the discharge.
The court noted that the local rule the Board cited vested the
authority to grant or deny a request to amend in the court of appeals,
but that a refusal to allow such an amendment-when timely filed and
in no way prejudicial to the Board-must find support in the record.
The court found no such support existed.
The Board next argued that the court of appeals erred in
determining Crutchfield had standing. The court observed that the
location and nature of Crutchfield's property easily allowed her to
allege two elements necessary for standing: actual or imminent injury
fairly traceable to a Board decision.
Finally, the court observed that the court of appeals could have
redressed Crutchfield's harm with a favorable decision, thereby
satisfying the third requirement for standing. The court remanded
the case to the court of appeals for a trial on the merits.
CurtisGraves

WASHINGTON
Pruitt v. Douglas County, 66 P.3d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (holding
that where a county's improvements made properties valuable,
homeowners had a cause of action against the county for subsequently
making improvements which flooded and destroyed homeowners'
properties).
In the 1930s, Douglas County made certain road improvements,
which reduced the natural flow of water across properties owned by
the Fletchers and the Pruitts (collectively, "Homeowners") from fifteen
cubic feet per second ("c.f.s.") to one to two c.f.s. A developer built
Homeowners' homes in 1967. In 1986 and 1993, Homeowners
purchased their properties. Between 1995 and 1997, the county made
certain road improvements, which resulted in flooding of
Homeowners' properties in 1997. Homeowners sued the county on
the basis of negligence, strict liability, trespass, and inverse
condemnation. The county motioned for summaryjudgment, and the
Superior Court for Chelan County granted this motion. Homeowners
appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, Division Three
("court"). The court reviewed de novo the trial court's grant of the
county's motion for summary judgment and noted that the moving
party's burden in summary judgment is to show, in the light most
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favorable to the non-moving party, no material issue of fact existed for
trial.
The court held that when a road collects and discharges water onto
adjoining lands in quantities greater than the lands' natural flows,
liability on the part of the municipality that built the road can arise
under three possible exceptions to the common enemy doctrine. The
exceptions are "(1) blockage of a natural drain or waterway; (2)
collection and discharge of a water onto adjoining lands in quantities
greater than, or in a manner different from, its natural flow; and (3)
failure to exercise due care in preventing unnecessary damage."
The court held that the lower court's grant of summary judgment
was improper because if Homeowners had proven that water flow
across their properties was one to two c.f.s. before the county's 19951997 improvements, the county would have been liable for damages.
The court reasoned that regardless of the county's negligence or lack
thereof, this liability resulted from the "collection and discharge"
exception to the common enemy doctrine. Its basis for this reasoning
was that the floodwater which damaged Homeowners' properties in
1997 was quantitatively and qualitatively different than that which
flowed over the properties prior to the 1930s improvements. The
court also held summaryjudgment was also improper under the "due
care" exception, which requires that property owners exercise due care
by "acting in good faith and by avoiding unnecessary damage to the
property of others." The court found the homeowners failed to
present any evidence of bad faith, but presented evidence on the basis
of which ajury could find the county failed to limit harm to necessary
harm. The court also held summary judgment was improper because
where the county negligently failed to maintain storm drains, the
causal relationship behind the county's negligence and damage to the
homeowners' properties was an issue for trial.
The court also held summary judgment was improper on the
homeowners' claim of inverse condemnation. The court reasoned the
homeowners stood to recover the full value of their property if they
could prove that the government (1) diverted "waters from the
direction in which they would naturally flow" onto the claimant's land,
or (2) the government increased the amount of water flowing onto the
claimant's land. Thus a material issue of fact existed.
The court denied the homeowners' request for fees and costs
because they provided inadequate argument and legal grounds on
which to base such a request.
James Parrot

